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First Principles and Practical Politics:
Thoughts on Judge Pryor's Proposal to Revive








In recent remarks to the American Law Institute, Judge
William Pryor recommended abandonment of the post-
Booker advisory version of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and adoption of a simplified presumptive federal
guidelines system.' It will come as no surprise to those who
follow federal sentencing debates closely that I find much to
admire in his address. I have been making variants of the
same argument for the past ten years-as co-reporter to the
Constitution Project's bipartisan sentencing initiative,2 as
a contributor in the Model Sentencing Guidelines Working
Group that in 2006 wrote and published a set of simplified
Booker-compliant guidelines,3 as a witness before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission,4 and in my private academic
capacity.5
Without repeating in detail what I have written else-
where, suffice to say:
First, I agree with Judge Pryor that the post-Booker
advisory system retains most of the flaws of the system it
replaced, while adding new ones.6 Moreover, its primary
perceived advantage-that of conferring effectively unre-
viewable discretion on sentencing judges-is not only
inconsistent with Marvin Frankel's first principles of sen-
tencing, as Judge Pryor observes,7 but taken to its logical
extreme is inconsistent with the rule of law itself Cer-
tainly, the doubtful advantages of the advisory system in its
present form are insufficient to justify its permanent
retention.
Second, there are a number of constitutionally permis-
sible alternatives to the court-created Booker regime.
Among these is a system of presumptive, simplified
guidelines mapped onto a simplified sentencing grid with
broader ranges. This alternative was originally proposed by
the Constitution Project,9 was later endorsed by Judge
William Sessions (then Chair of the Sentencing Commis-
sion),'0 and is now championed by Judge Pryor. If properly
designed, implemented, and maintained, this system could
be markedly superior to the Booker structure.
Third, the most daunting problem is not designing
a sentencing mechanism better than either the pre- or post-
Booker guidelines, but ensuring that such a system, how-
ever elegantly and expertly crafted, can survive contact with
the political system. It seems fair to ask whether a system
embodying the features advocated by Judge Pryor could
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gain the approval of any Congress resembling the one that
will just have been seated when this article appears. Still
more to the point, even if such a system could be con-
gressionally enacted, what would prevent it from replicating
the experience of the pre-Booker guidelines and becoming
over time a one-way upward ratchet prescribing ever higher
sentences?"
There was a time when I shared Judge Pryor's optimism
that a sensible system of simplified presumptive sentencing
guidelines could be enacted and could achieve its benefi-
cent ends for a useful period thereafter. I have not yet
surrendered the dream, but I confess to increased skepti-
cism. The remainder of this essay will explain my pessi-
mistic turn..
1. Obstacles to Initial Approval
Most of the daily actors and institutional stakeholders in
federal criminal justice do not give a fig for first principles.
They care about outcomes. Will a new system tend to make
sentences shorter or longer, and for what classes of defen-
dant? They care about their personal or institutional ability
to influence those outcomes. How much control will they
(as judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, sentencing
commissioners, or legislators) have over sentences gener-
ally and in particular cases? And some of them care about
optics. How will any reform look to voters?
Among defense attorneys, liberal sentencing reformers,
many federal judges, important Democratic legislators, the
bulk of academic commentators, and a fair number of
principled conservatives in and out of Congress, there is
general consensus that, pre-Booker, the severity of the
guidelines coupled with their restrictions on judicial
departure power too often produced unduly lengthy sen-
tences. The post-Booker transformation, by conferring
increased power on judges, has, on average, moved sen-
tences modestly downward.'" For those who approve of this
trend, a primary objection to restoration of presumptive
federal sentencing guidelines is that their purpose and
effect would be to stiffen federal sentences, or at the least to
halt the slow downward drift of sentence lengths for many
crime types that began several years after Booker.3
Therefore, in order for the revival of presumptive
guidelines to garner support from what might loosely be
termed the center-left of the sentencing debate, the guide-
line rules and ranges would have to be calibrated to permit
(even if they did not require) lower sentences than the
current guidelines suggest for some significant fraction of
federal defendants. Without such a recalibration, those in
the center-left will prefer to retain advisory guidelines in
anticipation of continued judge-driven erosion of sentence
severity.
Of course, both houses of Congress are now controlled
by Republicans, as is the Justice Department and the White
House. So Republicans could ram through a tough-on-
crime guidelines revision with no Democratic support. The
prime obstacle to this approach, perversely, is that it is
almost impossible to write dramatically simplified guide-
lines without allowing at least the potential of lower sen-
tences for some significant number of offenders.
Let me explain. As Judge Pryor correctly notes, simpli-
fying the federal guidelines would require replacing the
current 43-level sentencing table with a much simpler table
containing fewer, broader ranges.'4 The least controversial,
and therefore most probable, approach to designing such
a system would incorporate two premises: First, the seri-
ousness ranking of crimes should stay roughly constant-
meaning that defendants who rank at the bottom, middle,
or top of the current offense level scale would stay in
approximately the same relative positions in the new sys-
tem. Second, for each class of offenses, the distribution
along the offense seriousness scale of sentence lengths
prescribed by the guidelines should stay roughly the same.
For example, if the sentences prescribed by the current
guidelines table for the bottom quartile of drug offenders
range from a minimum of zero months (the bottom of the
lowest possible sentencing range in that quartile) to a max-
imum of 72 months (the top of the highest possible sen-
tencing range in that quartile), then the same range of
possible sentences should be available to the bottom quar-
tile of drug offenders in the new simplified table.
But a simplified sentencing table based on the foregoing
premises will inevitably lower the bottom of the sentencing
range for an appreciable fraction of the affected defendants,
which in turn reduces the minimum sentence that a judge
can impose on those defendants and still be within the
guideline range. For a simplistic illustration of why this is
so, see Figure i comparing two hypothetical sentencing
tables, an "old" complex table with eight sentencing ranges,
and a "new" simplified table with only four ranges.
If the relative severity rankings of defendants and the
sentence severity distributions within offense classifica-
tions stay roughly the same from the old to the new system,
most of the Figure i defendants formerly in Offense Levels
i and 2 should be clustered in the new, broadened Offense
Level i. Similarly, most defendants in old Offense Levels 3
and 4 should migrate to new, broadened Offense Level 2,
and so forth.
Observe that all defendants who fall into the shaded
even-numbered ranges under the old complex table would
retain the same maximum sentence under the new
Figure 1
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simplified table, but would enjoy reduced minimum sen-
tences under the new table. Defendants with the odd-
numbered ranges under the old complex table would retain
their former minimum sentences under the new simplified
table, but be exposed to new higher maximum sentences.
Because half of all defendants would receive increased
possible maximum sentences while half would receive
decreased possible minimum sentences, this result can be
characterized as increasing as many sentences as it
decreases. However, everyone familiar with federal sen-
tencing patterns is well aware that the within-range sen-
tences imposed by judges cluster overwhelmingly in the
bottom half of the applicable range.'5 The distribution
might even out slightly if the ranges were widened, but I
very much doubt the pattern would change radically.
Therefore, the probable result of an ostensibly outcome-
neutral simplification of the guideline offense table would
be that some significant number of defendants would be
eligible for, and ultimately get, lower sentences under the
new simpler system than they would have under the old
complex one.
Of course, it is theoretically possible to radically simplify
the current guideline table while blocking the possibility of
a lower guideline minimum for virtually all defendants. To
accomplish this end, every box in the new simpler grid
would have to set its minimum sentence equal to the
highest minimum sentence that any defendant assigned to
the new box would have received under the old complex
grid. However, this architecture would, of necessity, raise
either the guideline minimum, the guideline maximum, or
both for most defendants. Figure 2 shows why. The sim-
plified new table in Figure 2 would eliminate the possibility
of a lower minimum guideline sentence for any defendant,
and would raise both minimum and maximum guideline
sentences for all defendants in old Offense Levels 1, 3, 5,
and 7.
One can create a variety of hybrid table architectures, but
one cannot escape the math. If one cuts the number of
offense levels on the sentencing table by more than half,
most defendants will probably be assigned sentencing
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ranges with lower minimums than they would have under
the former system. Adopting an approach like the Figure 2
example to prevent that outcome would require raising the
minimum guideline sentence of most defendants, which
with the reintroduction of a strongly presumptive guide-
lines system would mean increasing the actual sentences of
tens of thousands of defendants annually. This result might
delight the dwindling circle of federal sentencing hardli-
ners. But it would be dismissed out of hand by Democratic
legislators and many other interested parties for whom
broad ranges giving judges discretion to sentence deserving
defendants below current guideline minimums would be
the major attraction of Judge Pryor's proposal.
Even if simplified presumptive guidelines could be
structured in a way that would not actually lower sentences
for many defendants, any plausible architecture would
inevitably look as though that result was possible. And
despite the notable recent evolution of many conservatives
16
away from reflexive punitiveness, there remains an
influential faction who react viscerally to the idea that any
appreciable number of defendants might receive lower
sentences. The persistence of this instinct was on vivid and
regrettable display during the failed effort to secure sen-
tencing reform legislation in the last Congress.'7 Legisla-
tion hacked by bipartisan coalitions in both the House and
Senate that would have made modest changes in mandatory
minimum sentences failed when opposed by a tiny number
of Republican Senators. This refractory band-prominent
among them the new Attorney General, former Senator Jeff
Sessions-claimed, loudly but incorrectly, that the bill
would cause the release of thousands of violent felons.'8
Despite the support of conservative stalwarts like Senate
Judiciary Chairman Charles Grassley (R-lowa) and Senator
John Cornyn (R-Tex.) and major Republican backers like
Koch Industries, Republican Senate leadership declined to
bring a bill to the floor and Republican House leadership
was content to let the matter die.
In sum, unless a simplified presumptive system was
structured to make a goodly number of defendants eligible
for sentences lower than the current guidelines prescribe,
Democrats would not support it. But if such a system gave
official imprimatur to sentences below current guideline
ranges for a significant number of defendants, a key faction
of conservative Republicans would probably try to block it.' 9
Unless the Republican leadership in both houses were to
abandon its now-customary policy of refusing to move any
legislation that requires Democratic support for passage,
I am not sure how one could thread that needle.
Moreover, I suspect hat congressional action would be
rendered even less likely by the reaction of the bench. Many
federal district judges would vocally disapprove of pre-
sumptive guidelines, however structured, seeing in them
a return to the "bad old days" before Booker, and more
crassly, as a direct strike at their discretionary authority.
They may also be chary of a system that would put more
facts to juries, adding time, complication, and additional
sources of possible error to jury trials. I agree with Judge
Pryor that the risk of unduly complicating jury trials is
much overstated,2 0 but perception may be more powerful
than reality in this case.
A good many appellate judges might baulk, as well.
While the post-Booker world deprives appellate courts of
meaningful power over sentencing outcomes, it also
relieves those courts of much of the workload created by
enforceable guidelines. Although I have not done an
empirical study, my work writing the annual revisions to
the sentencing treatise I co-author with Roger Haines'
suggests that fewer defendants are raising sentencing
issues on appeal, and even more importantly, that appellate
courts are devoting ever-diminishing amounts of mental
energy to resolving the issues that are raised. Questions of
guidelines interpretation that would once have called forth
pages of carefully reasoned judicial prose are now dis-
missed in an airy paragraph. I suspect hat many busy
appellate judges are perfectly happy with matters as they
stand.
Many congressmen do not care very much what the
judges think, and some would favor presumptive guide-
lines precisely to cabin judicial authority. But general judi-
cial disapproval would carry considerable weight for many
legislators of both parties.
Judge Pryor implicitly suggests that the interested par-
ties might accept a deal in which all or at least many man-
datory minimum sentences would be abandoned in return
for adoption of presumptive guidelines. He notes that if
presumptive guidelines were restored with provisions that
made downward departures from presumptive ranges dif-
ficult, the rationale for having mandatory minimum sen-
tences would be undercut." The idea has been proposed
before and makes good sense, but congressional Republi-
cans have never shown any disposition to make that trade in
the past.3 Moreover, Justice Departments under Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations have long cherished
the leverage conferred by mandatory minimums. I find it
hard to conceive that a DOJ headed by Attorney General
Sessions would ever agree to abandon so powerful a prose-
cutorial weapon, or that a Republican Congress would
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override the strongly expressed objections of a Republican
Justice Department headed by a former senatorial
colleague.
The only hopeful caveat I can offer to this pessimistic
projection is that a Congress totally controlled by Republi-
cans, unafraid of criticism from the left, and peering down
Constitution Avenue at a Republican Justice Department
and White House they no longer delight in thwarting might
do something surprising. And maybe Judge Pryor himself,
because he has immense credibility among conservatives,
could carry the project through.
II. Return of the Ratchet?
So let us suppose that I am entirely wrong about the sen-
tencing politics of the next congress and that, against all
odds, a sensible, simplified, presumptive federal guide-
lines system could be designed and enacted into law.
Suppose further that this system initially incorporated
a sober, balanced approach to sentence severity, one that
maintained rough parity with the seriousness levels of the
current guidelines while making some offense-specific
adjustments, but also gave judges reasonable room to do
justice within wider ranges and to depart downward from
those ranges in most cases in which they felt it necessary.
Even if this Goldilocks ideal could be achieved, the real
question is whether it could long survive. What, in short,
would prevent the resurgence of all the factors that, over
time, made the original federal guidelines a one-way
upward ratchet that pushed sentences perennially
higher?4
Judge Pryor's answer seems to rely on Congress. He
notes correctly that a radically simplified guidelines system
would require congressional egislation modifying certain
restrictive components of the Sentencing Reform Act. 5 He
also advocates requiring formal congressional enactment of
both the aggravating factors in the initial simplified guide-
lines and any new aggravating factors proposed thereaf-
ter.' 6 He opines that "requiring Congress to enact
aggravating factors ... would likely deter increases in
severity and complexity" because "the cumbersome,
bicameral legislative process would make change more
difficult than when the authority is delegated to a seven-
member commission."27
With the greatest respect to Judge Pryor, his prediction
seems to ignore Congress's well-documented, and acceler-
ating, propensity for inserting in bicamerally approved
legislation directives to the Sentencing Commission to
consider guideline amendments or direct amendments to
the guidelines themselves.28 I concede that, if a major
guideline overhaul were to pass through Congress, few
material amendments would probably be proposed for
some period thereafter. The original guidelines enjoyed
such a honeymoon in the years after 1987. But just as the
original honeymoon ended, so, too, would a second one, at
least absent some structural impediment to the seemingly
irresistible legislative temptation to raise sentences in
response to public outcry over the crime dujour.
A simpler guideline system does provide at least some
such structural impediments. First, a simple system pro-
vides fewer moving parts for legislatures to meddle with.
Second, a grid with a small number of wide guideline
ranges should deter legislatures from casually mandating
offense level increases for commonly occurring crimes
since even a single-offense-level increase would cause
a dramatic rise both in the sentences of individual defen-
dants and in the inmate load of the Bureau of Prisons.
Third, if a simpler system contained provisions that iden-
tified nonbinding factors for judicial consideration in set-
ting sentences within range, legislative additions or
amendments to such provisions would provide a vehicle for
members of Congress to claim credit for "doing some-
thing" without significantly unbalancing the guidelines
themselves. I confess to finding these structural arguments
somewhat more convincing than Judge Pryor's reliance on
the procedural drag of bicameralism.
Still, for reasons addressed in the next section, I am
fractionally less convinced of my own arguments on this
score than I used to be.
Ill. Hyperpartisanship, Neutral Experts, and the
Administrative State
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a product of a vision
of governance based on a set of assumptions that seem
increasingly antique:
That a body of neutral experts housed in a government
agency can be trusted to gather data and apply their exper-
tise to drafting and curating rules designed to promote the
general welfare. That other government agencies and
Congress will accord reasonable deference to agency
expertise. That the congressional parties can engage in
informed, dispassionate, non-zero-sum negotiations about
the shape of the initial rules recommended by such an
expert agency, as well as similar negotiations over subse-
quent modifications of the rules. That congressional ead-
ership will not insist that any successful egislation be
supported by all members of the majority party in each
legislative chamber, and thus that legislation supported by
cross-party coalitions is possible. That an established
agency can retain enough of the energy and imagination of
its formative ptriod to avoid becoming ossified and reflex-
ively protective of its original designs. That individual .
members of Congress will not yield, at least not very often,
to the perennial, invidious temptation to distort the crimi-
nal law for short-term electoral advantage.
But this is not the world we live in. Even in the 1980s
when the federal guidelines were first enacted, some of
these assumptions were unduly optimistic. But now the
very idea of sentencing guidelines-a system of rules
designed and tended (even if, as Judge Pryor would have it,
not formally enacted) by apolitical experts lodged in an
administrative agency-seems out of harmony with the
spirit of the present age. Our national politics is all tweet-
ing, trolling, bellowing, and preening. Research, facts,
nuance, consultation, compromise, legal and legislative
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craftsmanship, the very idea of expertise as essential to
governance, are now out of season. If and when they are
restored to favor, the prospects of success for Judge Pryor's
project may improve. For now, I am not sanguine.
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